Pride Goeth Before a Fall: Why the AKP Could Be Its Own Worst Enemy (Part I)

A citizen who voted in the 2014 Turkish presidential election in Istanbul

Turkey’s recent presidential elections were mired in controversy, even by the routinely volatile and bordering on insane standards of Turkish politics.  Even its immediate aftermath didn’t escape controversy and allegations of foul play, which also marked the entire run-up to the election itself on August 10, 2014.  But now that the electioneering is coming to an end, it would appear that new battle lines are being drawn across the Turkish political landscape, even within the previously-thought-to-be-invulnerable AKP.

Unofficial results of 2014 presidential elections in Turkey

The presidential election itself produced yielded some interesting and somewhat unexpected results.  First of all, while the current prime minister and presidential front-runner Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had been predicted to win handily with both a significant lead over his rivals and with a large margin beyond the 50%+1 votes required in the first round, in reality he only won with 51.79%.  This was despite the lowest voter turnout since the 1970s at 74.13%, which should have theoretically amplified ballots cast by AKP voters and widened Erdoğan’s lead.  Also, the overwhelming presence in the media in favour of Erdoğan, the blatant abuse of Prime Ministry resources, and the questionable decisions of the Supreme Elections Board (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu or YSK in Turkish), all of which were noted in the OSCE’s preliminary report on the elections among other concerns, should have given Erdoğan an overwhelming advantage to win the election.  Instead, it appears that he was barely able to squeak by with just over the bare minimum number of votes required for a first round win.  More to the point, the possibility that Erdoğan’s presidential win might end up being a Pyrrhic victory appears to be growing in the post-election environment.

“If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans, we shall be utterly ruined.” – Pyrrhus of Epirus

The immediate aftermath of the presidential election has been almost as revealing as the election itself, and would seem to offer insights into the rather murky internal politics of the ruling AKP.  Erdoğan’s and his parliamentarians have fudged the process of his transition from prime minister to president in a number of ways, including forcing the TBMM to break earlier than scheduled, delaying the publishing of the election results in the official TBMM gazette, and even moving up the date of the AKP’s convention to elect a new party leader (as Erdoğan would no longer be allowed to legally remain in that position, as the presidency is supposed to be a non-partisan post).  In fact, the latter two of these are scheduled to take place on the same day, August 27, 2014, just one day before Erdoğan is officially sworn in as president.

The question on everyone’s mind has been why.  Why are parliamentary traditions and protocols being fudged or even broken outright in the wake of an apparently clear presidential victory for Erdoğan?  Conspiracy theorists have been pointing to the fact that Erdoğan needs to minimize the time that he is ‘out of office’ so as to keep his parliamentary (and later presidential) immunity from prosecution as uninterrupted as possible.  While there may be some truth to this, the far more likely reason is that Erdoğan and the AKP want to rig their own party’s transfer of power to avoid internal divisions.  Yes, you read that right: the AKP is internally divided, and apparently pretty dramatically.

Former Turkish Prime Minister and newly-elected President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Like many others, I suspected that such internal divisions existed for a long time, but were kept under wraps so as not to damage the image of the AKP as a united and hard-working party, especially when compared to the older, chaotic, and internally capricious parties in Turkey.  But while following the aftermath of the elections after August 10, 2014, I noticed a new distinction being made among Turkish commentators: “pro-Erdoğan media” instead of (or as an alternative to) “pro-AKP media”.  This would appear to be in line with the reality that, at least on paper, Erdoğan will no longer officially be in charge of the AKP as of August 28, 2014.  This could, in theory, be a sign of the first cracks appearing within the AKP, as it struggles to keep its momentum without the public presence and charisma of Erdoğan, at least on paper.

The fact is that Erdoğan needs the AKP to realize his goals and ambitions, particularly his desire to transform Turkey’s political system into a presidential system from a parliamentary one, with him as the powerful president, of course.  Erdoğan especially needs an unquestioning AKP in the TBMM to push the legislative side, and a united AKP in the public sphere, so that he can use all its resources (e.g., media, finances, ability to mobilize voters, etc.) should the presidential system debate require a referendum (as it would be a significant change to the constitution).  In essence, Erdoğan needs a remote-controllable AKP from August 28^th onward.

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and soon-to-be Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu at the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014

This is very likely why Turkey’s foreign minister, the architect of the disastrous “zero problems with neighbours” policy and seemingly neo-Ottomanist Ahmet Davutoğlu, has been officially elected from within the AKP to be the party chairman, and likely the future prime minister to replace Erdoğan.  Choosing Davutoğlu to be the AKP chairman and future PM isn’t an accidental choice for Erdoğan.  The presidency represents the Turkish state, not the Turkish government, and since 2009 Davutoğlu has been in charge of shaping the most important state function: foreign policy.  Thus, Davutoğlu will effectively be the representative of the ‘state’ (i.e., Erdoğan) in the TBMM.  Indeed, contrary to what has been stated, Davutoğlu will be no more than a puppet prime minister for Erdoğan’s “active” presidency.  This also means that the neo-Ottomanist foreign policy, which has been the cornerstone of Turkey’s international relations under the AKP (including its disastrous results), will still be actively represented under the Erdoğan-Davutoğlu team’s tenure, particularly since this is the first foreign policy that has actively translated into real electoral results.

(Left to right) Disgruntled former AKP Minister of Culture and Tourism Ertuğrul Günay, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Ahmet Davutoğlu at Yunus Emre cultural centre opening in Cairo, 2011

The implication for Turkey, however, is that the perceived lack of official leadership in the AKP (or a leadership that is remote-controlled from the presidential palace at Çankaya), could (and indeed seems to be) result in fractures within the AKP itself.  This is a classic case for Turkish politics, where a particular party’s success rests too much on the shoulders of a single charismatic and powerful individual, the absence of which results in intra-party infighting.  They say success breeds success.  In Turkey, success only breeds pride.  And as we all know, pride goeth before a fall.